

## Deployment Overview

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Lead – Integrated Planning Cell for Ottawa Convoy Demonstrations &  
Silver/Strategic Command – Operations

- On **February 7<sup>th</sup> 2022** at 1943 hrs I received a call from Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins asking if I would accept an assignment as planning lead for an Integrated Planning Cell to support the Ottawa Police Service with the ongoing trucker demonstrations in downtown Ottawa. I accepted the assignment and proceeded to Orillia OPP General HQ for a 0900 hrs briefing.
- On **February 8<sup>th</sup> 2022** at 0900 hrs I attended a briefing with Commissioner Carrique, Deputy Harkins, Supt. McDonell and Supt. Abrams (on video). Updates at to current status, guidance and information provided as follows:
  - Focus of assignment was clear – to support the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) in rebuilding trust and confidence in their service and furthermore support a coordinated effort to end the protests; that we were there to support/build an operational plan that complements the OPS and that the OPS will remain as the lead agency with operational control.
  - There was mounting pressure on the OPS for action and the Chief of Police, Peter Sloly, has made numerous requests for police officers to support OPS.
  - Planning Team would be supported by RCMP, Peel, Toronto, York and Waterloo in addition to the OPP.
  - Learned there was a loss of confidence in the OPS and their Chief, with pressure from City Council and the Federal Government
  - That there is no Ops Plan – we need to look to what is needed in the next 24, 48 and 72 hrs with the first step to sustain the front line and support POU.
  - Was provided full support for whatever was needed to plan, deploy and execute a plan in support of Ottawa.
  - That POU Hubs were set up for support a coordinated approach.
  - East Region has been supporting OPS for past number of days and received an update from Supt. Abrams on some of fundamental leadership concerns within the OPS, e.g. their lead EM/POU person resigned his position over unreasonable expectations
  - That the OPS did not have an Operational Plan for the ongoing event and they did not support a PLT engagement approach – PLT are there but not operationalized.

- That a priority of OPS was the occupation at Rideau and Sussex but that at this time, there are no heavy tow trucks ready to go.
  - PLT – Insp. marcel Beaudin is engaged and available as required.
  - That there was a planned event for Toronto on the weekend which will impact resources.
  - The all Big 12 policing partners are willing to deploy personnel as required by the plan.
  - Contact at OPS was said to be Insp. Deb Palmer.
- Planning team held its first meeting at 1735 hrs from RCMP HQ with the OPS (all OPS were on video or conference call). Also note that Counsel for the OPS, Christiane Huneault was present at the request of the Chief. Chief Sloly was scheduled to attend but was pre-empted by other urgent/pressing matters.
- Team was introduced to OPS members who were advised we were there to help and do what we can to complement their plan.
- A/Deputy Chief Trish Ferguson provided an overview of the OPS Strategic Concept of Operations followed by Supt. Mark Patterson, the OPS MCIC assigned on staffing demands over the next few days.
- Specifically Patterson provided an overview of a plan to action POU at Rideau and Sussex on Thursday next at 0600 hrs. There were 38 trucks there and one was demobilized, the latter being a pickup truck.
- As a result of this briefing learned the following:
  - There was no finalized plan for tow trucks – this was proving to be difficult due to threats + limited capacity for heavy tows in the areas. We advised MTO will be engaged to assist
  - There was no traffic plan to complement the action.
  - There was no allowance for PLT to get protestors to move within the perimeter
  - Impacts from other areas unknown or not considered.
- OPS was asked if they would consider an Integrated Command Structure – was advised it could be logistically difficult but would explore it further. We asked for an officer to be assigned with us for ease of access to information etc.
- During the meeting there was reference to their plans which were requested so that we could continue to build on/complement their plan; they agreed they would be shared but unfortunately were not.
- Stressed we needed to know objectives/mission for this particular action so that any officers deployed could be properly briefed on expectations etc.
- The MCIC advised there was an overarching plan for the city but could not speak to the number of officers needed.
- D/C Ferguson asked the MCIC if Phase 3 of the Ops Plan could be shared – MCIC agreed it would be sent. It was again stressed that we were there to help, that police agencies are going to contribute however all agencies need a plan so they can articulate logistics and needs for the deployment.
- We asked about their capacity to respond to calls for service and this was explained – they were stretched thin. Further, staffing in the Red Zone (protest area) was 47 OPS, 30 OPP and 20 RCMP.

- Communications – was advised they have limited radios, to get agencies to bring their own however they did have access to 1200 RCMP radios which they had used in the past.
  - Discussion around injunctions - Stressed we needed to develop a plan without politics, that communications/comms plan would be key and that we cannot operate in silos, media was not portraying what was happening on the ground.
  - D/C Ferguson advised there were many children on ground, that prayer meetings were held every morning, and that it was starting to get dangerous. Further that 6 trucks had left today and many want to but can't get out.
  - OPS Chief was facing serious threats to himself and was very worried about his family.
  - It was evident that members of the OPS were under tremendous stress and were tired. Meeting ended with my explaining the benefits of the OPP Healthy Workforce Team and offered their assistance.
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- On **February 9<sup>th</sup> 2022** our team commenced at 0700 hrs and unfortunately the above noted plan had not been received.
  - Learned that Supt. Chris Rheame had been assigned to liaise with our team however at this point he had no knowledge of the plan as he had not been engaged. Learned that everything had to go to the Chief first before it could be actioned or released to our team.
  - Our team received an extensive intelligence briefing from Supt. Pat Morris, OPP POIB.
  - Early morning learned from Deputy Harkins that the Ambassador Bridge had been closed by protestors and that we will need to look at this event more broadly and specifically we needed to know resource needs for Ottawa as we would be deploying to Windsor as well.
  - At 1205 hrs a part of our team met with Chief Sloly and his team at OPS HQ – 474 Elgin Street.
  - In addition to Chief Sloly both deputy chiefs, the MCIC as well as the OPS General Council among others were present at the meeting.
  - We made it clear we were there to help but that we needed access to their plan to allow us to properly resource it.
  - During the meeting to separate documents were provided, a 24 page Ottawa Truck Demonstration '22 Plan dated February 09<sup>th</sup> and an OPS Strategic Concept of Operations Plan dated February 08<sup>th</sup>.
  - The Con Ops Plan was a one pager and contained a 7 point strategy.
  - Of concern, the plans had conflicting Mission Statements and were very limited in detail, furthermore key aspects of their plan – crime – needed to be embedded right away and not at the end of the plan as articulated.
  - Chief Sloly was very passionate about the impacts the demonstration was having on the city and he was looking to break the occupations however they had limited ability to affect this due to base line levels of staffing.

- I offered that we were there to ensure that he had what was needed to sustain operations but needed a plan. He advised they were working on last minute plans.
- Chief Sloly advised that they had developed a deliberate action plan for priority areas and that they were focused on taking back one street at a time while acknowledging that would be a drain on resources.
- The OPS Team provided a very high level overview of their Con Ops and advised that they need a minimum of 516 officers per day in addition to POU.
- The MCIC detailed their deliberate action plan for Rideau/Sussex for 0400 hrs the next day and further that they may look to move it up.
- Key issue identified was that they had problems with heavy tows and had resorted to using OPS employees with appropriate licence classification to move vehicles out of the area to a holding area.
- The above was deemed to be Phase 1 and he advised that Phase 2 would be to move to Wellington Street with Phase 3 being Kent Street.
- Chief Sloly made clear that the focus of the Freedom Convoy was in Ottawa and furthermore that negotiations with the demonstrators had not been working. At one point during this meeting Superintendent Abrams challenged OPS on whether the PLT Plan had been actioned and was assured that it had however this was in contradiction with information that we had received.
- During the meeting, with my support, one of our POU SMEs offered tactical advice suggesting that their deliberate action plan be stood down for a later in the week operation, that approximately 800 POU members would be needed and that the plan should include a steady progression to remove the blockades in all areas, and not one at a time in the manner previously explained.
- Chief Sloly was again very passionate and suggested that there was a resource reliability issue that he was concerned about and asked if we could guarantee resources. We had discussed the provincial/national nature of the protest but he made it very clear, if you end it in Ottawa you end it everywhere.
- We respectfully disagreed and he indicated that if we have a better plan, with assurances and no caveats around resource commitments it would be accepted on consult with his PSB Chair and Mayor, again if we offer guarantees.
- The overall tone of this meeting was somewhat unprofessional and disrespectful. Chief Sloly was very clearly under tremendous pressure to act and was very suspicious of levels of commitments from police agencies.
- He went as far as to advise us that he had sources in the Ministry office, that his requests were not being supported and essentially they wanted him to fail.
- There was disagreement on this point from our team.
- After the Chief and his team left the room Inspector Debbie Palmer remained with our team and we again pressed for copies of their plan, e-versions and she stressed the Chief's comments that some aspects of their plan had not yet been approved.
- Following this meeting members of my team including myself received apology messages from other OPS members in the meeting regarding the Chief's unprofessional behaviour.

- Prior to departing OPS Headquarters Superintendent Lue and I had opportunity to meet with Acting Superintendent Paul Burnett who was the assigned Incident Commander for the direction action plan for the next day.
- He indicated that he had received the plan and was doing a legal consult but also wanted to consult other POU Commanders before approving it.
- Based on the information received from the OPS our team began building a deployment plan around the 516 FTE request that was made. Through much discussion and de-confliction it was determined that this number was based on a 3 shift 24 hour deployment, 178 FTEs per shift. With the clarification provided a resource request for additional 356 officers was made.
- With respect to the direct action plan, we committed to mobilize the necessary POU members and through our team's liaison with POU, commanders were given authority to make the final decision on whether the plan could not be executed safely and effectively.
- By 1820 hours on this date we learned that in fact the plan had been rejected based on the tactical assessment and advice from POU commanders.
- By end of day as noted our team was mobilizing a request for an additional 356 officers. Additionally the OPP was floating additional cruisers Ottawa to support the deployment.
- During a telephone call with DC Ferguson we discussed the Chief's comments about planning under them which I agreed we could do and that we would need to be working within a unified command structure. She expressed that she was in complete agreement with this and appreciative of our team's effort and will continue to work with the Chief but noted that he is under tremendous pressure.
- It should be noted that while some progress was made our team still lacked the fundamentals of their operational plan, beyond certain traffic points, that would effectively allow us to build a more robust plan in support of OPS.
- On the 10<sup>th</sup> of February POU-SME Sergeant Darwin Tetreault of the RCMP presented a high level concept of operations based on the totality of the information that we had from the OPS but more importantly intelligence that would support a systematic and safe action plan to demantle the entire protest zone.
- Our team received a detailed update from Inspector Marcel Beaudin on the appropriate focus of PLT wherein he informed us that his team had been working hard to firm up a plan however the disjointedness caused by their command structure was really an issue however assurances were given that OPS PLT did have a green light to action their plan.
- This plan was eventually communicated to senior commands in our respective organizations and was complemented by both intelligence and information received from PLT, Inspector Marcel Beaudin.
- An important factor that was considered in all decisions moving forward was that this was not a single event in Ottawa, rather it was provincial and national in scope.
- Our team continued to build on our plan including outreach to the big 12 agencies for resourcing, working with the OPP EOC on resource deployment including the logistics support from East Region and POU deployment.

- By end of day progress was being made however the OPS were still unable to provide our team any insight into the duties for which they were requesting a significant number of resources to be assigned to. Frankly it was abundantly clear that our key obstacle was at the Chief level however our team was resolved to work as expeditiously and effectively with the rank and file OPS members.
- On **February 11<sup>th</sup>** our key tasking for the team was to shore up the positions that the OPS required filling within their plan; to this point we had nothing.
- The team also learned that MCIC Superintendent Patterson had been relieved of his duties by the Chief and a new Incident Commander Acting Superintendent Rob Bernier had been assigned. (Note: Overall, Bernier was very proactive and engaged with our team on the plan from that moment forward.)
- On this date we focussed on a tow plan courtesy of TSOS/MTO collaboration. We also had to adjust our resource deployment based on the need to secure border points in East Region and other locations.
- Notwithstanding our requests to the OPS we did not receive the required information and learned from our liaison that they were pushing this information to the OPP POC. This required a sit down meeting with OPS reps and frank discussion on the role of our planning team; that all requests to fill positions in their plan should be sent to us along with their plan. OPS was further advised of the additional pressures emerging around the province; that to date we have not received responses from Chiefs of Police and that a plan would be helpful, in fact is needed to make that happen.
- At 1645 hours our team presented our proposed plan to senior command in the RCMP and the OPP with significant support. This plan was a detailed concept of operations for which our team would build the entire POU plan however it still relied heavily on injects from the OPS planning team.
- I was tasked with insuring the plan was presented to Chief Sloly to gain his approval so that we could action/finalize it.
- Very early and throughout this deployment DC Ferguson was the voice of reason and conduit to the Chief.
- Superintendent Lue and I presented the plan at a high level to her and she immediately voiced her full support. She preferred however that she be permitted time to present it to the Chief and we agreed to prepare and forward a slide deck for her use, which was completed, and that we would be available regardless of time to answer questions. Finally we also offered to meet again with the Chief if he wished. She confirmed that from her perspective a unified command was the direction to take in this matter.
- On **February 12<sup>th</sup>** our team worked in earnest on our plan while keeping heightened awareness on events that were transpiring around the province and country.
- At 1145 hours having not heard from the OPS on the plan I placed a telephone call to Chief Sloly. I advised that we were there to help and that I was fully aware of the emerging issues and the resource deployments around the province, as well as the needs in Ottawa. I advised we were looking to work in a more

integrated fashion that insured resources were strategically placed where needed, that I had provided DC Ferguson with that plan. He advised he wasn't sure what was agreed to yet as to how that integration was to happen so a call as soon as possible would be good to get all on the same page as to the nature of that integration, how it works and how it works to all other theatres of operation.

- Following this call and within the hour I learned from my team that they had been liaising with Bernier who advised there was no need to meet with the Chief as we were good to go as he had spoken to the Chief. This appeared to be a significant gap in communication and I asked for confirmation of same from the Chief.
- At 1400 hrs I placed a call top Deputy Chief Bell upon learning Chief Sloly would like a briefing on the plan. I suggested 1530 hrs would be appropriate and he agreed.
- At 1504 hrs I received a call from DC Bell who apologized but advised that the meeting had already started and the Chief was insisting it happen now.
- At 1510 hours this date we joined a TEAMS call in progress with Chief Sloly and his team including the new Incident Commander and Counsel for the OPS. The tone of the Chief's comments during this meeting was very troubling to the point that I asked if the Chief wanted my team to leave the call to allow him to speak privately with his team first. He was blunt in saying no, he would get to us momentarily.
- During this call I arranged for Sergeant Tetreault to present a slide deck of the concept of operations that was developed that included a measured approach, strategic communication around re-building confidence and trust in the Ottawa Police Service and policing in general, vital PLT communication and negotiation plan and systematic dismantling of the blockades with a POU plan once voluntary compliance was no longer feasible. Furthermore the psychology of crowd dynamics was reviewed and embedded within this plan. Key in the plan was reducing the protestor footprint through compliance and that ensuring safety, above everything, was factored in at all stages.
- There was discussion around strategic messaging and that a unified command is needed to develop daily objectives and that we all need to be on the same page with messaging. It was stressed that when the Chief speaks publicly the Nation is listening and that he can be the single point of failure for this event, but we can avoid that. While this was said in a constructive and supportive way it was not taken that way.
- Chief Sloly advised that he would only speak if he has confidence that an operation will be successful and delivering on what he is saying and that he is not the single point of failure.
- Apologies were provided to him with the way this conversation was framed and additional context added.
- Chief Sloly reiterated that he will voice what he believes his commanders can do, but if he is not getting the right information, if he doesn't have intelligence to support it, if he doesn't have integrated command, he will not be able to voice what he doesn't believe in.

- We stressed that everyone needs to be working in the same direction and that integrated command is something that we can supply, that there had obviously been some miscommunications but we all want to work together and that we are there to help him!!!
- IC Bernier spoke up in support of our conversation and approach.
- We had discussion about integrating the command, location of CP and some apparent momentum being gained with the new IC.
- Chief Sloly near the end of this call indicated that he had given explicit approval two days prior about getting proper PLT negotiation plan embedded and a proper command structure and he advised he had not seen that until today.
- He stated that he was hopeful that it was not too little too late but definitely too late and that we needed to get going on this.
- We ended the call with my advising him that we had full confidence in his team and would work closely with them.
- I reviewed and signed off of our detailed Ops Plan by end of this date, as did the RCMP – all that was required was approval by OPS. Tasking for the next day were set re: support plans to the overall plan.
- On **February 13<sup>th</sup>** we still did not have approval from Chief Sloly yet in consult with OPP senior command forged ahead with developing roles of Senior and Strategic Command and the absolute importance of these roles in support of the Incident Commanders.
- I/C Bernier committed that by afternoon, he would have approvals for the plan. By this stage, PLT were engaged with the protestors as per plan.
- I spent a significant portion of the day liaising with Commands from OPP, OPS and RCMP.
- At 1550 hrs I received a call from I/C Bernier who was accompanied by OPP MCIC Springer. It was a very productive call with the following key takeaways:
  - He reviewed the plan and only requested a couple minor edits. In response to my question about approval he advised he loves the plan and what integration brings to support... "Yes, the plan is approved."
  - Will move forward with planning integration as well!
  - RCMP/OPP I/C integration will support decision making
  - Strategic Command and its role in insulating I/Cs to allow focus on operations!!
  - The need to revisit (while moving forward) resourcing and deployment. He was in full agreement that resourcing needs to be driven by the plan and not a number.
  - POU aspects will rely on SMEs for development (near complete) and we will continue to resource what is needed.
  - Current dialogue with PLT needs to continue re: voluntary exits
  - We will to establish a reporting cycle
  - That the team will continue to build on key execution aspects of the plan.
- I reported on the above; some concerns remained that Chief Sloly was not the approver of the plan. This had been covered off with Bernier.



- At 1805 hrs I discussed the above with D/C Ferguson. She advised that she fully agreed with Bernier's authority to sign off, that we were good to go! I discussed Strategic Command with her and its purpose – setting direction/objectives etc and provided her support in articulating this to her Command. She expressed her full support and further that their planners would be integrating first thing in AM with our team. I also addressed a gap in their Traffic Plan and need to loop in Chief Thomas and his team – she agreed.
- At days end our focus was on dealing with varying legal opinions on the EMCPA.
- On **February 14<sup>th</sup>** our day started with a meeting with ICs Bernier and Springer where a decision was made on where to locate the integrated command centre.
- A member of our planning team Inspector Tim Skinner (POU SME) was assigned as the POU planning group lead the previous day and was entrenched with POU SMEs in the development of the POU plan.
- Significant time was spent throughout the day around the logistics of mobilization, who was looking after what to ensure that we were being as efficient as possible.
- OPS planning team attended our location and it became quickly evident that they were burnt out and stressed to the max however they continued to work with us team to finalize key aspects of our plan.
- Key issues dealt with through the day related to the OPS need to have their lawyer approve the plan which was understood based on everything they had been going through however was unusual in the context of a lawyer approving an operational plan.
- While it was established that all key commanders would be kept in the loop it was learned that the mayor of Ottawa had engaged with the protesters and negotiated them to all move to Wellington Street and that OPS made some decisions on action.
- I/C Bernier briefed us at 1811 hours that due to the mayor's decision it was a good time to take positive action on those who stayed outside of Wellington. As a group we challenged him on the Intel and tactical advice received to allow us to pivot quickly and support it.
- Following significant discussion agreement was finally reached to push Bernier's action plan to the following day after which it was decided that in order to properly mobilize sufficient POU to action the plan 48 hours would be needed – this was agreed to.
- This was an incredibly dynamic and busy day however the key takeaways remained abundantly clear, that the OPS notwithstanding our agreement for integration was still in charge of the event and hadn't fully 'integrated'.
- Furthermore it was determined throughout this date that I/C Bernier was being pulled away continuously to brief his Chief and this was creating frustration within our planning group especially as it related to the POU component. I tactfully addressed this concern with OPS.
- Superintendent Lue and I had been invited but declined an invitation from DC Ferguson to present our plan and integration to Ottawa City Council and their Police Services Board.

- On **February 15<sup>th</sup>** I met with OPP senior command and was asked to attend the OPS PSB meeting and provide the briefing as requested. This was agreed to in light of the Morden Report and the responsibilities of the Police Services Board.
- It was agreed that I would attend after sufficient preparation and that the Chief needs to be in agreement with what we say. It was further supported that my attendance would be contingent upon this meeting being held in camera.
- Shortly after the above meeting concluded it was learned that Chief Sloly had resigned from the Ottawa Police Service.
- Our team forged ahead with the same plan with support from the Ottawa Police Service. By end of day most aspects of our plan were set and we compressed our timelines for the plan with intention of positive action by Friday February 18<sup>th</sup>.
- February 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> was spent dealing with a myriad of legal and logistical issues to ensure that we were ready to action the POU plan on the 18<sup>th</sup>. By end of February 17<sup>th</sup>, negotiations by PLT not working and their safety became a concern!
- For the next four days, February 18<sup>th</sup> through the 21<sup>st</sup> the I/Cs actioned the POU plan and systematically dismantled the protest starting at Nicholas/Waller followed by Rideau/Sussex and then onto Wellington. Day one of the plan concluded successfully at Rideau/Sussex and by end of day two the majority of the protesters had either moved on or were arrested. The last two days was focused on the systematic clean up and removal of vehicles etc.
- Considering the original size of the protest and number of vehicles embedded within, the plan was very successful on the front end in negotiating approx. 75-80% of the vehicles to leave, and throughout in changing the narrative around the protest and the police and most importantly in executing it in a way that achieved the goal of public and officer safety.
- The balance of my time in Ottawa was spent largely on the maintenance stage of the plan, the returning of the City of Ottawa to normalcy.
- I concluded my time in Ottawa on February 27<sup>th</sup> with the final meeting on demobilization of external police agencies.

### **Core Integrated Planning Team**

- Insp. Tim Skinner – York Region PS
- Insp. Tom Warfield – Peel Region PS
- Sgt. Arleen Duffy – Toronto PS
- Cst. Isabelle Either – Toronto PS
- D/Cst. Andrew Wernert – Peel Region PS
- Supt. Phil Lue – RCMP
- Sgt. Darwin Tetreault – RCMP
- Mr. Brad Taylor – OPP
- Supt. Craig Abrams – ER Logistics & Planning liaison
- A/Supt. Mike Francis – first 3 days & then POU on ground Command

Below is an executive summary of the plan developed by the Integrated Planning Team. The Team remained incredibly flexible throughout the deployment but remained steadfast in our focus – rebuild public confidence and trust in the Ottawa Police Service, communicate and negotiate a reduction in protester footprint ahead of our action plan to dismantle the protest, all with PUBLIC and OFFICER safety at the forefront of all decisions!

### **Mission Statement**

The mission statement remains the same. Using an integrated response, the Ottawa Police and policing partners will keep the peace, enforce legislation, and maintain public safety for the duration of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration, with the utmost respect to the individuals Charter of Rights and Freedoms with priority on community and emergency services personnel safety & wellbeing.

### **Objectives**

#### **Phase 1: Stabilization Plan**

- i. Maintain the peace and continue peaceful stakeholder engagements utilizing the Provincial Liaison Team Framework and Strategy, with an aim to encourage protestors to leave the area;
- ii. Rapidly escalating the key messaging, media/social media messaging, and officer briefing materials to:
  - o Educate and instruct all persons attending the Ottawa Protest that their presence is unlawful and they are breaking the law by continuing their presence.
  - o Make note of all lawful authorities available to police and potential outcomes of continued noncompliance (e.g. Emergency Act, Provincial Statutes, and bylaws, etc.)
- iii. Review the security baseline resource requirements for all protest related sites/locations, including ensuring the integrity of the continuity of government, roads/highways, and other critical infrastructure protection requirements;
- iv. Increase the level of coordination with all partner agencies, establish a unified command model and determine *Course(s) of Action*, ensuring that the required resources to complete the stated mission are available for the next phase of the operations; and;
- v. Commence the coordinated rapid mobilization of members/equipment and ensure the logistical supports are developed and resilient enough to support a sustained operation, while ensuring communications interoperability and integrated training.

## Phase 2: Action Plan

- i. Following an Intelligence lead policing model, utilize an integrated intelligence structure to identify:
  - o Potential threats by protestors/vehicles and any heightened risks to the police action elements, local residents, and critical infrastructure; and
  - o Priority areas/vehicles/protestors for targeted actions to clear unlawful assembly in the safest approach possible.
- ii. With a criminal investigative focus, increase the application of enforcement of all available legal mechanisms to increase safety, reduce the level of criminality and discourage continued unlawful activities;
- iii. Utilizing an integrated Public Order model, strategically retake the unlawfully held roadways and lands with the support of specialized teams (in prioritized stages), arresting unlawful protestors that will not leave, clearing and making safe all ground/vehicles/structures in stages;
- iv. Utilizing fencing, vehicles, other obstacles and natural barriers to fortify the roads and land recovered by police operations and fortifying those areas with an increased police presence, surveillance and area interdiction strategy; and
- v. Sustained public messaging and media/social media messaging to update the public on the process of enforcement that includes actions taken, results achieved, and being actively responsive to inquiries (exclusive of tactics).

## Phase 3: Maintenance Plan

- i. Removal of all garbage, debris, obstacles and obstructions; as well as the removal of graffiti, removal of snow and the inspection of roads and other critical infrastructure prior to reopening;
- ii. Regularly reviewing the common operational picture to ensure the rapid reopening of the City of Ottawa in a sustained manner; while maintaining a surge capability for any reoccurrence of road blockades, while continuing to support lawful protest in accordance with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
- iii. Commence with a 20% surged demobilization and redeployment of specialized teams, with the focus on those sent from outside Ontario, while concurrently redistributing remaining resources to ensure adequate security coverage in the maintenance phase;
- iv. Through intelligence lead assessments, begin the tiered reduction of police installed barriers/obstacles back to but not including Wellington Street that may remain under a police closure until the well into the Demobilization Phase, but maintaining the ability to rapidly re-deploy barriers within 4 hours' notice; and

- v. Actively encouraging the City of Ottawa through outreach to local businesses and Business Improvement Area (BIA) Association to encourage the reopening of local/impacted business, stores, offices and facilities.

#### Phase 4: Demobilization

- i. Further demobilization of police resources while maintaining a heightened police presence and surge capacity in downtown core for a visible deterrent and to prevent reoccurrence;
- ii. All local businesses, transportation networks, gatherings and activities are encouraged to reopen and resume normal operations under the current COVID-19 restrictions;
- iii. Termination of the City of Ottawa Declaration of Emergency; and
- iv. Continued criminal investigations and prosecutions.